

D
802
A1
R43
1950

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

REORGANIZATION OF TACTICAL FORCES

B-13

V-E Day to 1 January 1949



~~50007000~~
U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE
Ft. LESLIE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5008

DOWNGRADED AT 5-YEAR INTERVALS
DATE 11 FEB 97 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES

UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORICAL DIVISION EUROPEAN COMMAND

LIBRARY

APR 19 1957

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

APO 403
10 March 1950

SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series

TO : All Concerned

1. The Department of the Army under current regulations requires the preparation of annual historical narratives of the activities of the U.S. Army of Occupation in Germany. The preparation of the narrative history of this headquarters is the responsibility of the Chief, Historical Division, European Command. Histories of the U.S. Air Forces, Europe, and the U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, are prepared by those organizations.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, published by the Historical Division, EUCOM, consisting of consecutive narratives, special studies, and monographs constitutes an official history. Each publication in the Series is based upon study of appropriate documentary sources and interviews with responsible officials. Before publication each manuscript is reviewed for accuracy and completeness by the appropriate staff divisions or subordinate command having a primary interest in the subject.

3. The publications in this Series endeavor to furnish a factual and complete account of leading problems and their solutions, major operations, and lessons learned in the course of the occupation. They are, therefore, immediately valuable in orienting key personnel arriving for duty in the Command. They also serve as source material for current instruction in Command and Staff schools of the Army, and eventually will be used in the preparation of a definitive history by the Department of the Army.

4. In order that the Series may be of maximum value to the Command and to the National Defense Establishment, persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward comments and criticisms to the Historical Division, European Command, APO 403, U.S. Army.

Thomas T. Handy
THOMAS T. HANDY
General, USA
Commander-in-Chief

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

U S Army Military History Institute

Reorganization of Tactical Forces

VE-Day to 1 January 1949



UNCLASSIFIED
REGRADED BY AUTHORITY
OF DOD DIR. 5200.30
BY *[Signature]* ON 1/30/96

Occupation Forces in Europe Series

HISTORICAL DIVISION
U. S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
KARLSRUHE, GERMANY
1950

LIBRARY
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.

PROPERTY OF US ARMY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PREFACE

In the space of approximately four years which have elapsed since the end of World War II, the United States Army, Europe, has undergone a process of change which, by the spring of 1949, has resulted in a tactical organization tailored to the conditions (including manpower and logistics potential as well as geography and politics) existing in present-day Europe.

The following study was prepared with a view toward highlighting the peculiar conditions affecting the organization of U.S. Army, Europe, during this period and setting forth the problems faced by Theater planners in evolving an organization equipped and capable of meeting those conditions.

A great deal of emphasis has been placed upon the changing organization of U.S. Constabulary since the Constabulary organization is and has been peculiar to this Theater. Not only is the Constabulary an organization without counterpart in the U.S. military establishment, but it, too, has been faced with peculiar organizational problems as its primary police mission has been relaxed and its tactical mission emphasized.

In considering the 1st Infantry Division (which, together with the Constabulary, comprises the bulk of tactical troops in U.S. Army, Europe) the problem of manpower with which to effect reorganization has been a major problem which has been treated in some detail. Also, in connection with the 1st Infantry Division, the discussion of attached and assigned units not usually an organic part of the infantry division but essential

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

to its operation in this Theater, has also been treated in some detail.

For a more complete treatment of the manpower and organizational problems of the European Command and the place occupied by tactical forces in that organizational structure, it is suggested that the reader see Occupation Forces in Europe Series, The Evolution of the Occupation Forces in Europe, 1 Jul 47 - 30 Jun 48.

UNCLASSIFIED

Staff

HISTORICAL DIVISION

Chief Historian. Col. Harold E. Potter, Inf. (17 Dec 45-)
Deputy Chief Historian Col. Harry C. Larter, Jr., FA (25 Sep 47-
21 Oct 49)

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY BRANCH

Chief. Lt. Col. John R. Ulmer, Inf., (11 Nov
46 - 21 Sep 49)
Chief. Lt. Col. Hugh McDonald, FA (13 Sep 49-)
Assistant Chief. Bernard V. Hall, M.A. (23 Oct 46-)

EDITORIAL GROUP

Chief of Review Branch Col. Russell F. Albert, FA (11 Jul 49-
24 Feb 50)
Maj. Leonard L. Lerwill, Inf., (2 May 46-
4 Jul 49)
Chief Historical Consultant. Joseph R. Starr, Ph.D. (1 Feb 46-20 Mar
49)
O. J. Frederiksen, Ph.D. (23 Jun 49-)
Editorial Assistant. Joanne M. Lucas, B.A. (14 Feb 49-)
Production Manager and Chief
Cartographic Section Stanley E. Hughes (13 Oct 45-)

AUTHOR

Francis S. Chase, M.B. (13 Jun 47-)

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
I.	THE FIRST TWO YEARS.	1
	1. Early Concepts of Forces Required.	1
	2. Mission of the Occupation Forces	2
	3. Effects of Redeployment on Tactical Concepts	3
	4. The Concept of a Strategic Reserve	5
	5. Concepts of the Occupation	7
	6. Status of Tactical Forces during the First Half of 1946	8
	7. Proposal for a Foreign Legion.	10
	8. Utilization of Civilians	10
	9. Employment of Displaced Persons to Replace Military Guards	12
	10. Further Reductions in Troop Strength	13
	11. Nontactical Role of Tactical Troops.	15
II.	THE SEARCH FOR TACTICAL MANPOWER.	20
	12. Revival of the Tactical Reserve Concept.	20
	13. Situation of 1st Infantry Division on 1 January 1947	22
	14. Re-emergence of the Reserve.	23
	15. Concentration of the 26th Regimental Combat Team	24
	16. Effect of 26th RCT Concentration upon Other Elements of the 1st Infantry Division.	26
	17. Reorganization of U.S. Constabulary.	27
	18. The Constabulary Reserve	29

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
	19. Proposal for Constabulary Field Artillery Units	31
	20. Other Measures to Improve Combat Efficiency	32
	21. Summary of Tactical Concepts at End of 1947	52
III.	REORGANIZATION OF THE CONSTABULARY IN 1948	37
	22. Rumors of Change in U.S. Constabulary	37
	23. Beginning of the Reorganization	38
	24. Training During the Reorganization Period	40
	25. Delay in Formal Reorganization.	41
	26. The Reorganization Plan	41
	27. Light Tank Training	43
	28. Formal Reorganization of the Constabulary	43
IV.	REORGANIZATION OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION IN 1948.	47
	29. Difficulties Involved in Reorganization	47
	30. Changes in the New Division T/O&E	48
	31. Provisional Reorganization.	49
	32. Training of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division during 1948	52
V.	DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. ARMY, EUROPE	55
	33. Situation at End of 1948.	55
	34. Effect of the Reorganization.	56
	35. Joint Training in 1948.	57
	36. Plans for 1949.	58

CHAPTER I

The First Two Years

CHAPTER I

The First Two Years

1. Early Concepts of Forces Required

a. Prior to V-E Day, there were many concepts of the size and composition of the forces required for the occupation of Germany. Almost invariably, in the early planning stage, the estimated size of the planned force was far greater than was ever actually achieved, while its estimated composition would have given it almost unlimited offensive capabilities. The earliest such estimate appeared in the basic plan for Operation RANKIN Case C, which called for a force of 22 divisions, supported by an air force of 71 squadrons and 11 ground force divisions deployed on the flanks and along the lines of communications. This force was to be so composed that a large and highly mobile tactical reserve would be available at all times for use when required. The first outline of the TALISMAN Plan -- later known as the ECLIPSE Plan -- issued on 9 July 1944, provided for no change in the RANKIN Case C concept of the Occupational Troop Basis (OTB) or the

maintenance of a mobile tactical reserve beyond increasing from twenty-two to twenty-three the number of divisions earmarked for occupation of Western

(2)
Germany. President Roosevelt's estimate, made on 19 November 1943, was
said to provide for "an occupation force of about one million U.S. troops
(3)
for at least a year, maybe two."

b. In January 1945 the first authoritative OTB -- and one much closer to the first OTB actually established -- was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It authorized the following troop strengths for Europe (excluding Italy):

V-E plus 4 months to 1 year	721,000
After V-E plus 1 year	379,000

If the United States should accept full occupational participation in Austria,
(4)
these figures were to be increased by 73,000 and 28,000, respectively.

3. Mission of the Occupation Forces

a. The primary mission of the Occupation Forces was to occupy the conquered enemy country, maintain law and order, disarm, demobilize and demilitarize Germany, and support the United States Military Government there. Most of the early planning centered upon the performance of this primary mission, although it was understood that certain secondary missions would devolve upon the Occupation Forces, particularly in the early post-V-E period. These secondary missions, which included the shipment of men and supplies to the Pacific Theater of Operations, the opening of lines of communication into the Soviet Union in the event that the U.S.S.R. entered the war against Japan, the care and disposal of surplus Army property not required in the Pacific Theater, the care and repatriation of displaced persons, and the

temporary operation and protection of lines of communication entering Germany by way of neutral and Allied countries, were to be completed within a reasonable length of time or, when practicable, transferred to other agencies.
(5)

b. In all planning for the accomplishment of the primary mission, the "X" of the equation was the character of the conquered people. How deep did the roots of Nazism really go? What resistance would be encountered? How extensive would be the underground movements and how widespread the acts of sabotage? How much would be required in terms of force to deal with civil disturbances in a defeated country where food, clothing, and fuel would be lacking? These were questions to which only approximate answers could be offered, yet they were questions vitally affecting the size and character of the Occupation Forces.

c. A mission inherent in the over-all mission of the Occupation Forces, but one to which little consideration was given during the planning period, was that of supporting United States policy in Europe. At this stage it was hardly more foreseeable that German resistance would be scattered and almost non-existent than that, within the year following V-E Day, United States commanders in Europe would be thinking in terms of defense against aggression by a major power, not Germany, and trying to devise plans for holding a beachhead in Western Europe with pitifully inadequate forces.
(6)

3. Effects of Redeployment on Tactical Concepts

a. On V-E Day, the United States Army in Europe and in the United Kingdom totaled 3,069,000 men, including air forces. From the standpoint of

strength, only one other army then in existence was larger and none surpassed it in morale, equipment, training, logistics support, mobility, and striking power in proportion to size. But beginning with V-E Day and the adoption of the point system of redeployment, a process of deterioration set in which affected the establishment of a stable Occupation army. It was understood that any early consideration of an OTB for Germany would be largely academic, since it would necessarily be some time before the excess troops above the first estimated OTB of 404,000 on V-E Day could be removed from the Theater. It was assumed that while awaiting redeployment they would be employed as needed. However, the high rate at which redeployment was accomplished left the Theater not only with a manpower problem, but with a much greater problem of morale. A high turnover in personnel, both officer and enlisted, produced a sense of instability and impermanency in all units, both those scheduled for redeployment as carrier units and those earmarked for Occupation duties, so that officers responsible for administering the redeployment program in the European Theater admitted that the Army had disintegrated into a mass of individuals awaiting redeployment and separation (7) from the services.

b. On 23 August 1945 the War Department ruled that the troop ceiling for the European Theater would be 370,000 instead of the 404,000 upon which theater planners were counting, that this ceiling must be reached by 1 July (8) 1946, and that further cuts were imminent. This change meant a complete revision of concept regarding the mission of the Occupation Forces. Each element was carefully examined with a view to eliminating any not completely essential. Combat elements of the Occupation Forces received the closest

scanning, since they seemed to offer the best possibilities for saving manpower. Under the new OTB the trained soldier had become an almost unjustifiable luxury. The man whose characteristic task was to fight could not be allowed to devote time to training, improving his skill with weapons, or studying military science. Most, if not all, of his time had to be devoted to the administrative and supervisory tasks which formed the bulk of the work of the Occupation Forces.

4. The Concept of a Strategic Reserve

a. In August 1945, Theater planners still considered the formal primary mission of the Occupation Forces as the one with which they should be most concerned and were keenly aware that elimination of its combat elements would leave the U.S. Army in Europe ill-prepared to deal with a concerted German uprising. They hoped, however, to forestall any possibility of disaster in this direction by maintaining a substantial armored element and by keeping a considerable combat force in a reserve characterized as "strategic," "tactical," or "mobile."

b. By September 1945, however, the idea of a strategic reserve for
(9)
employment on short notice anywhere in Europe, was abandoned. In mid-October, instructions were issued to the major commands that "no strategic
(10)
reserve as such will be retained." This did not mean complete abandonment of the idea of a reserve, but it was realized that a strategic reserve in the sense of one capable of being employed outside the Occupied Zones of Germany and Austria was an impossibility in the face of diminishing troop strength. From October on, the reserve was referred to not as strategic, but as tactical or mobile or both.

c. At about the same time, it was realized that the Occupation Forces were incapable of action for the enforcement of national policy outside the Occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and were suited only for defensive action within those areas. At the end of September 1945, USAFE reported that the majority of that command was currently nonoperational because of (11) the redeployment of high-score enlisted men. By 1 November, Theater Headquarters recognized that the Occupation Forces as a whole were incapable of action outside the Occupied areas if they should be called upon for strategic support of other Allied forces or for the execution of national policy in other parts of Europe. (12) Before the end of 1945, an even more critical situation was revealed by Theater Headquarters when the G - 3 Division made a study of the combat efficiency of the Occupation Forces and estimated that they were incapable of defending themselves from assault (13) by a major power.

d. In October 1945, in view of the serious limitations imposed by the manpower situation and the rapid lowering of the authorized troop ceiling for the European Theater, the War Department asked the Theater to consider a police-type Occupation for Germany and Austria. It was felt that such an Occupation Force would result in higher efficiency at a lower cost in manpower and funds. (14) A similar theory had already been evolved in the G - 2 Division of USFET, where a plan was developed for a centralized counter-intelligence agency and the creation of a constabulary along the lines of (15) state police forces in the United States. Theater Headquarters contemplated a security organization consisting of a rearmed German police at the base with the main responsibility of maintaining law and order and pyramiding

up to a constabulary organization which would have the broad mission of
(16)
protecting American interests and personnel. Theater Headquarters approved
the War Department's suggestion and agreed that the middle of 1946 would be
(17)
a good time for putting the plan into operation.

e. Although the concept of a strategic reserve had been abandoned,
the concept of a mobile reserve to reinforce the new constabulary force
was still being considered. By the end of 1945, the composition of this
reserve had been decided upon. It was to consist of three infantry
divisions, three armored field artillery battalions, three tank battalions,
three antiaircraft battalions (SP), one separate infantry regiment (Negro)
(18)
and essential supporting troops. The one parachute infantry regiment at
Frankfurt was also to be considered part of the "Theater reserve."

f. Even this concept of a mobile reserve was far from being firm, for
early in December General McNarney announced in a staff conference that
the OTB of the Theater was to be reduced to 300,000 instead of the 363,000
then authorized by the War Department, and that this strength would be
(19)
reached by 1 July 1946. It was recognized in the Theater that a process
of gradual reduction was in force, and there were many who doubted if any
sort of reserve could be maintained above the constabulary strength with-
out a radical change in the mission of the Occupational Forces.

5. Concepts of the Occupation

a. The army-type Occupation, under which forces were deployed in what
was spoken of as a blanket Occupation covering the entire area, remained
the basic concept of the Occupation of Germany and Austria until the idea of

the constabulary was evolved. Planning circles in the Theater, however, felt that this was a waste of manpower and that the dissipation of forces in small scattered units rendered them incapable of military action. It had been ruled on several occasions that combat units in the Occupation Forces must be stationed at strategic points in not less than regimental (20) strengths. However with the rapid decrease of manpower in the European Theater and the cumulation of Occupational duties, it was not uncommon to find companies and even platoons stationed at points isolated from their parent organizations. As a result administrative overhead was increased, discipline deteriorated, and not even a semblance of training could be carried out.

b. Until such a time as Occupation Forces could be concentrated and the various duties of the Occupation organized in such a way as to permit this concentration, the mobilization of a reserve in the Theater was all but impossible. But the consideration of a police-type Occupation was assumed to foreshadow such a concentration.

6. Status of Tactical Forces during the First Half of 1946

a. The OTB for 1 July 1946, reducing Occupation Forces to 307,000 (including 7,000 personnel assigned to special War Department agencies and units in the Theater), had hardly been dispatched when word was received from the War Department that troop ceilings for 1 January and 1 July 1947 would be 202,000 and 160,000 (including 43,000 air force) for those two dates, thus confirming the earlier belief of some Theater planners that (21) troop ceilings would be reduced to a point where no reserve would be possible.

Of this number, 39,000 were planned for the U.S. Constabulary, then in process of organization and partial training. Various missions connected with the war, such as guarding of surplus property, supply warehouses and dumps in neutral and Allied countries; the custody and maintenance of German prisoners of war; and the care of displaced persons, were making manpower demands beyond the Army's capabilities, and there was little indication that relief from these missions would be forthcoming.

b. In a series of letters which passed between General Eisenhower and General McNarney, who had succeeded General Eisenhower as USFET CinC, the impact of international events upon thinking in USFET Headquarters was made plain, and a protest against reducing Occupation Forces below a ceiling of 300,000 was lodged. But on 25 June 1946 the War Department submitted to Congress troop ceiling figures which indicated that the proposed reductions (S2) would remain firm.

c. In the spring of 1946, the command in the European Theater was forced to consider its course of action in case of aggression by a major power. Thinking in terms of the three combat divisions then available to him under the 307,000 troop ceiling, General McNarney wrote General Eisenhower that it would be hopeless to attempt to defend the U.S. Zone of Germany against aggression and that the minimum strategic concept acceptable was that of withdrawal, together with the British and French, to a bridgehead. He further estimated that the forces under his command were not capable of evacuating the Continent without British assistance. At that time, his effective mobile reserve consisted of the equivalent of two divisions. He estimated that by withdrawing from static duties in the Occupation all troops

under his command, 91 battalions could be mobilized. These would be equivalent in strength to only five divisions as against a minimum of (23) thirty divisions required to hold a 100-mile bridgehead based on Antwerp.

7. Proposal for a Foreign Legion

a. In October 1945, when the pressure for return of U.S. troops from abroad was at its height in the United States, the War Department proposed that the Theater Commander give serious consideration to the idea of recruiting foreign manpower in Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, France and other neutral and Allied countries for service in the Constabulary. (24) Such foreign nationals would serve under U.S. officers and noncommissioned officers and, at the outset, recruitment would be limited to those having a basic knowledge of English. A staff study accepting the plan for the Theater was approved by Major General White, then Chief of Staff, USFET, on (25) 25 January 1946. But on 21 February General Bull wrote General Hall that the Theater had reversed its decision and wanted the constabulary to be "All (26) American."

b. The decision to exclude foreign troops from the Constabulary did not mean that the Theater had no wish to employ foreign troops to make up its manpower shortage. Military attaches in Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands were requested to query those governments as to the availability of units of their armies for service as security guards, but replies to these inquiries indicated that such troops were not available.

8. Utilization of Civilians

Had military personnel been required to carry the whole burden of the

Occupation, the training of a tactical reserve for the European Command
(27)
would have been impossible. But large numbers of civilians in various
categories, from Germans and displaced persons to U.S. citizens, shared
that burden, though in gradually diminishing numbers, during the first
four years of the Occupation. On 1 July 1945 some 625,000 prisoners of
war and mobile civilians were employed in the European Theater in support
(28)
of U.S. forces. By contrast with the great number of Allied civilians,
displaced persons, and prisoners of war serving the Army in Europe on V-E
Day, only a handful of U.S. civilians were employed by the Occupation Forces
in Europe in the spring of 1945. Most of these were technical specialists
of various kinds. This number increased rapidly during the fall of 1945
and the spring of 1946, as civilians were recruited from the United States
and increasing numbers of enlisted men and women and officers were allowed
to request discharge overseas in order to accept employment with the
Occupation Forces. Under this process, civilian positions were established
in practically every staff section, raising a few questions as to the status
of a civilian in a military unit but effectively reducing the over-all re-
quirements for military personnel at technical installations and Command
headquarters. Large numbers of civilians were recruited from Allied and
neutral countries early in the Occupation, under special arrangements with
their respective governments. On 1 July 1947 employees from Allied and
neutral countries numbered 6,673, compared with 9,910 employees of U.S.
citizenship. The total civilian personnel strength of the Army in Europe,
including U.S., Allied, and neutral civilians, DP's, and enemy and ex-enemy
personnel, fell from 375,466 on 1 July 1946 to 278,479 a year later, as troop

strength also declined and numerous responsibilities resting on the Occupation Forces became supervisory rather than operational. On 1 July 1947, 71 percent of all civilian employees were Germans, 17.3 percent were displaced persons (mainly serving as guards), 4.3 percent were Austrians, and 3.6 percent were U.S. citizens. (29) Germans were used primarily in maintenance, depot and supply, hospital, food service, and construction work, and in vehicle operation, communications, general office, and custodial work.

9. Employment of Displaced Persons to Replace Military Guards

During 1946 and 1947 the displaced persons freed by the advance of Allied troops offered a particularly valuable source of manpower for use in supplementing the U.S. Occupation Forces in Germany. Early in the Occupation, Polish displaced persons were the only major category of civilians who could be used to replace U.S. soldiers as guards. Additional DP's, especially those from the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), were organized into technical labor service units. Displaced persons from Western European countries could not be employed on a wholesale scale because their repatriation was quickly carried out. Special training of displaced persons as guards began with the formation of a guard unit at Kaefertal Kaserne, near Mannheim, in May 1945. By the end of the year, it was plain that Polish guards, when properly organized and trained, could give outstanding service. (30) DP-guard and other labor service units numbered 364 at the end of 1947, and had a strength of 1,246 supervisors and 34,109 laborers. (31) The policy of reducing these units continued from early 1947

throughout 1948, as displaced persons were encouraged to emigrate and guard responsibilities were largely shifted to the new "industrial police," most of whom were Germans; to local civil police; and, in a few instances, to American soldiers. By 1 October 1948, displaced persons in organized guard units numbered only 7,903 while a total of 15,050 civilians, mainly (32) Germans, were serving the Army as industrial police.

10. Further Reductions in Troop Strength

a. In the latter half of 1946, there were signs of relief in sight for Theater planners: the disposal of surplus property was proceeding at a pace that permitted cutting down the manpower required for that operation; the newly-organized Preparatory Commission, International Refugee Organization, (PCIRO) was scheduled to take over the problem of displaced persons beginning 1 July 1947; there was a general feeling that the State Department would take over nonmilitary tasks in the Occupation; and the belief had grown that a treaty for Austria would permit the withdrawal of troops stationed there and the use of their spaces in Germany. However, the last two developments did not materialize, and the Army still found itself occupied to a considerable extent with displaced persons.

b. It was planned that the reduction to the 1 July 1947 OTB would be effected gradually, but there were radical changes in theory regarding the composition of the Occupation Forces as reduced from 300,000 to 117,000, exclusive of air force. In the spring of 1946 military leaders were thinking in terms of protecting American lives and interests in the face of major aggression by a European power or of chaotic conditions resulting from

(33)

uprisings in France and Italy or both. And from this point of view, it appeared that the Occupation Forces should have a hard core of trained combat elements, including three divisions to make up a tactical reserve. By late summer of 1946, however, the planners were convinced that no matter how desirable it might seem to maintain a strong force in Europe, budgetary requirements demanded reduction to the barest minimum. Thus it became necessary to forego thinking in terms of meeting special contingencies, such as a major war or widespread uprisings, and to plan in terms of performing only those tasks which fell strictly within the Occupation mission or which were necessary because of military commitments in Europe. (34)

c. By midsummer of 1946, a modified police type of Occupation had been instituted. The U.S. Constabulary had become operational, on the assumption that it would be backed up by a tactical reserve of regular field forces in times of emergency. Since this was beginning to appear impossible, some planners at Theater Headquarters began to think in terms of a complete police type of Occupation, with the combat reserve entirely eliminated and with Occupation Forces consisting only of the U.S. Constabulary and such service and administrative elements as were necessary for its support. This theory was expressed very strongly in a letter of 11 August 1946 from General Clay to General Bull. (35) General Clay expressed his opinion that the Constabulary, if maintained at a strength of 38,000, would be strong enough to control any threat to security within Germany and to extend martial law to an area where special difficulties might arise. General McNarney was in agreement with this theory and felt that a long range conversion of Occupation Forces to the Constabulary and its supporting troops was an answer to

(36)

the pressing manpower problems.

d. Another view expressed at USFET Headquarters in the summer of 1946 was that the air element of the Occupation Forces was out of proportion to ground and service strength. General McHarney proposed to the War Department that the air element of the Occupation Forces be reduced to one fighter group, one reconnaissance group, and transport services. (37)

11. Non-tactical Role of Tactical Troops

a. The idea of a tactical reserve was finally abandoned. At the time of the creation of the U.S. Constabulary, plans had called for a tactical reserve of three divisions. Later plans reduced the reserve to one division. But on 19 September 1946 a letter from European Theater Headquarters to major commands, outlining the reductions necessary to meet the 1 July 1947 OTB of 117,000, provided for a reduction of the reserve to a single regiment less a battalion. Tactical units were to have primarily static duties in the Occupation and were to subordinate their tactical capabilities to their administrative and custodial duties. No service forces were to be retained for the purpose of supporting the remaining tactical elements in a combat role. The first phase of reducing to the 117,000 OTB was to include discontinuance of the four separate regiments remaining in the Theater and of some elements of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division; reduction of Third Army Headquarters to a static rather than a combat role; and redeployment in the Theater of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division to replace the separate infantry regiments. In the final phase, the entire Third Army Headquarters (38) would be phased out.

b. On 24 September 1946 the 1st Infantry Division, then concentrated in the area Bamberg-Regensburg-Landshut with the mission of training as a tactical and strategic reserve for the European Theater, was given the new mission of serving as a static force in the Occupation. In a conference on the OTB at USFET Headquarters on 24 September 1946, a representative of the G - 3 Division said:

"We recognize and the War Department recognizes that we have no tactical capabilities and that we will not have any tactical capabilities; and the training of battalions, regiments, etc., for tactical work is over and that the only training we can do will be individual training, very small group training, and most of that will be on-the-job."

c. Toward the end of 1946 the War Department requested a new survey of the combat efficiency of major units in the European Theater. With combat efficiency of 100 percent regarded as ability to take the field on a combat mission, Headquarters, European Theater, estimated the combat efficiency of U.S. Constabulary -- the only unit available for tactical missions in the Theater -- as 65 percent. The 1st Infantry Division, deployed in small detachments throughout the Occupation zone, was estimated to have a combat efficiency of only 20 percent.

d. By 1 July 1947, U.S. Constabulary provided a tactical force believed capable of dealing with internal security in the Occupied areas and charged with the primary mission of maintaining order in those areas. But there was no strategic or tactical reserve other than that maintained within the organization of U.S. Constabulary, and troops of the 1st Infantry Division were so widely dispersed on static assignments that "operational capability of the Division as a tactical fighting unit was greatly reduced."

FOOTNOTES

1. COSSAC (43) 40 (Final), 12 Aug 43, sub: Operation HANKIN.
2. Ltr, SHAEF G - 3 Div, 9 Jul 44, sub: Post-hostilities Planning, inclosing Operation TALISMAN -- Planning Policy, SHAEF/21542/Plans.
3. JCS Paper 942, 9 Jul 44, appendix, par 2.
4. Ltr, WD AG, 17 Jan 45, sub: U.S. Forces Required after Defeat of Germany (Except in U.S. and for War against Japan), (JCS 942/5), transmitting JCS 942/5, file AG 320.2 TS (15 Jan 45) OB - S - E.
5. JCS Paper 942, 8 Jul 44, appendix, par 7.
6. Ltr, McNarney to Eisenhower, 3 Apr 46.
7. Occupation Forces in Europe, Series 1946 - 47, sub: Redeployment; Occupation in Europe, Series 1947 - 48, sub: The Evolution of the Occupation Forces in Europe.
8. Cable WX - 53894, AGWAR sgd WARCOS to USFET Rear, 23 Aug 45.
9. Staff study, USFET G - 3 Div, approved 8 Sep 45, sub: Airborne Forces on OTB, file GCT 370 - 4 JPS.
10. Cable S - 29064, USFET sgd Eisenhower to Maj Comds, 24 Oct 45.
11. Cable UAX - 80405, USAFE sgd COMGENUSAFE to AGWAR for WARCOS, 29 Sep 45.
12. Cable S - 30032, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for WARCOS, 1 Nov 45.
13. Staff study, USFET G - 3 Div, approved 23 Nov 45, sub: Estimates on Future Troop Basis, European Theater; attached paper on same subject, par 4.
14. Cables, W - 72324, AGWAR from Marshall to USFET, 2 Oct 45; W - 74194, AGWAR from Marshall to USFET personal for Eisenhower, 9 Oct 45.
15. Staff Study, USFET G - 2 Div, 14 Sep 45, sub: Reorganization of Security Forces, 322 (GSI/CIB/SC).
16. Cable S - 27081, USFET sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for Marshall, 8 Oct 45.
17. Cable S - 30032, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for WARCOS, 1 Nov 45.
18. Ltr, USFET to CG's, USAFE and Third and Seventh Armies, 17 Jan 46, sub: Occupational Planning, AG 322 GUTAGED.

FOOTNOTES Chapter I--Continued

19. USFET, TC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 1, 18 Dec 45, par 1-4; Notes Covering Decisions of the Theater Commander Relative to Occupational Forces, sgd Brig Gen A. S. Nevins, AGoFS, G - 3.
20. Cable S - 20064, USFET sgd Eisenhower to Maj Comds, 24 Oct 45. This cable contains one of the most authoritative statements of this principle: "The divisions in occupation will concentrate, preferably in approximately regimental strength, contingent upon terrain and other governing factors."
21. Cable WX - 99005, AGWAR sgd WARCOS to USFET, 1 Mar 46.
22. Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1947 - 48, sub: Evolution of the Occupation Forces in Europe.
23. Ibid.
24. Cable W - 76246, AGWAR to USFET, 16 Oct 45.
25. Ltr, White to Hull, 25 Jan 46, AG 370.09 TSC(OG).
26. Cable W - 96643, AGWAR to USFET, 12 Feb 46; teleconference Washington-Frankfurt.
27. IRS, D/OPOT to Chf, EUCOM Hist Div, sub: Reorganization of Tactical Forces, V - E Day - 1 Jan 49, 6 Jul 49.
28. EUCOM SS&P Div, Notes of SS&P Wkly Staff Conf, 15 Jul 47, sub: Employment of Labor Service Units, presented by Lt Col J. M. Palmer, Trp and Labor Br, SS&P Div.
29. Figures collected from USFET and EUCOM G - 1, Civ Pers Br, by Miss Garnie Walker, EUCOM Hist Div.
30. EUCOM SS&P Div, Notes of SS&P Wkly Staff Conf, loc cit.
31. Interv, E. S. Lay, EUCOM Hist Div, with M/Sgt C. A. Carleson, EUCOM SS&P Div, Trp and Labor Br, 14 Nov 47.
32. EUCOM Log Div, Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48, p. 18.
33. Ltr, General Clay to General Bull, 11 Aug 46.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.

36. IRS, USFET, CoFS to Gen Allen, sgd Maj Gen H. R. Bull, 17 Aug 46, sub: Future OTB for European Theater.
37. Ibid; cable S - 5446, USFET sgd McHarney to AGWAR, 28 Oct 46, as summarized in JCS 1332/12, 28 Apr, 20 May 47.
38. Ltr, USFET to Maj Comd, 19 Sep 46, sub: Reduction of Occupational Troop Basis, AG 320.2 GCT - AGO.
39. 1st Inf Div Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 46, par 39f.
40. Ltr, USFET to Maj Comd, 28 Sep 46, sub: Minutes of Occupational Troop Basis Conference, AG 320.2 GCT - AGO, inclosing Minutes of Conference, subject: Occupational Troop Basis, 24 September 1946, remarks of Lt Col Given.
41. Cable S - 5673, USFET sgd McHarney to AGWAR for GPO, 5 Nov 46.
42. 1st Inf Div Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 46, par 39f.

CHAPTER II

The Search for Tactical Manpower

CHAPTER II

The Search for Tactical Manpower

12. Revival of the Tactical Reserve Concept

a. During the latter part of 1946 and the early months of 1947, a plan was formulated for the reorganization of the European Theater by re-establishing military districts and making the military communities (military posts) the basis for reorganization of the entire Occupation Forces. This plan aimed to conserve manpower and to avoid the necessity for further reorganization (1) if the strength of the Occupation Forces were to be still further reduced.

Under this plan, the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary would each be responsible for administration of a military district. The main purpose was to reduce administrative overhead by placing all units under the military posts in whose geographical boundaries they were stationed.

b. The first effect of the reorganization, however, was to further weaken the combat elements of the Occupation Forces. Remaining combat elements became the first victims of the search for manpower with which to

strengthen 1st Division and Constabulary headquarters and to man the station complements of the military posts. The light tank elements of the Constabulary were the first to go. Reduction in strength in other elements of the Constabulary occurred soon after, as it did in numerous service, administration, and intelligence units.

c. However, the immediate impact of the reorganization did not reflect its long-range implications which, if no further drastic reductions in troop strength occurred, meant a manpower saving. Such a manpower saving would at an early date permit at least a partial reassembling of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. At the same time, it was expected that a gradual reduction in the police-type duties of the Constabulary would take place as the German police force, customs service, railroad police, and other services became operational. Thus the Constabulary, too, would be available as a reserve.

d. On 8 August 1946 Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, wartime commander of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, USFET, and, on 31 August 1946, Chief of Staff, USFET. But the date which may be taken as the real start toward reconstituting the United States Army in Europe as an effective tactical force was 15 March 1947, when Headquarters, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, was established at Frankfurt, Germany, with Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner as Commanding General. Headquarters, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, was redesignated, effective 15 November 1947, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, (USAREUR).

13. Situation of 1st Infantry Division on 1 January 1947

a. At the beginning of 1947 the 1st Infantry Division was distributed
(8)
as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Area of Responsibility</u>
1st Bn, 26th Inf Reg	Ludwigsburg	Wuerttemberg-Baden
2d Bn, 26th Inf Reg	Munich	Part of Bavaria
3d Bn, 26th Inf Reg	Muernberg	War Crimes Trials
Div Arty, 5th & 33d FA	Fulda	Greater Hesse
32d FA Bn	Bamberg	Part of Bavaria
7th FA Bn	Landshtut	Part of Bavaria

The dispersion of the 1st Infantry Division was actually much greater than is shown in this tabulation since some of the battalions were further subdivided. The 2d Bn, 26th Infantry Regiment, for example, was distributed in three companies and six detachments in nine towns, in addition to its headquarters city, Munich. In the early part of 1947, with its troops so widely deployed that training and control by the divisional commander was impossible, headquarters administrative responsibilities further reduced the potential effectiveness of the unit as a field headquarters in time of emergency.

b. General Huebner's appointment as Commanding General, U.S. Army, Europe, indicated a return to the concept of a tactical reserve, to be realized as rapidly as manpower could be uncovered. This was also shown in preparations to open the Grafenwehr Training Area, formerly an extensive training area of the German Army, as the training center of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. Headquarters, 26th Infantry Regiment, was directed to move to Grafenwehr, with the mission of preparing the area for use by 1 May 1947. It was planned to use the center for the training of company-size units,

which would be given a 4-week basic training course. Training began in May, and continued in five training cycles until the middle of November. Each battalion, except those of the 16th Infantry Regiment, was required to release a company or battery periodically for training. (9)

c. When the 26th Infantry Regiment was assigned to establish a training center at Grafenwohr, General Huebner wrote a letter to the various post commanders and the commanding officers at the Bremen Port of Embarkation and the Berlin Military District announcing his intention of reassembling at the earliest possible moment the scattered elements of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. In effect, this letter served notice that the 1st Division would soon be unavailable for static duties in the Occupation and that military posts where 1st Division units were presently assigned would have to find other manpower to carry out those duties, or reorganize in such a way as to free them. The 4-week release required immediately for training purposes was simply a first step in this direction.

d. As a result of these letters and the growing belief that it was essential to re-establish a reserve force in Europe, the various posts and agencies of the European Command conducted a critical self-scrutiny beginning in the spring of 1947, with the express purpose of tightening organization, eliminating jobs wherever possible, making better use of available German labor as well as of U.S. and Allied or neutral civilians, and closing out at the quickest possible rate the secondary missions growing out of the war.

14. Re-emergence of the Reserve

a. By the summer of 1947 the establishment of a combat reserve as an

element of the Occupation Forces had been accepted as EUCOM policy and, after a period of eight months without a reserve, dating from the reduction in strength imposed in the fall of 1946, the European Command was again establishing a combat reserve designed to cope with special emergencies. This reserve was kept within the prescribed troop ceiling, with no request to the War Department for an increase in strength, and was made possible only by a reduction in the number of troops available for the day-to-day tasks of the Occupation. The first stage in development of the reserve was the freeing of combat elements from their static duties for periods of field training and maneuvers.

b. The new reserve consisted of three principal elements. The first element, a general reserve, consisted of the 26th Regimental Combat Team and the 18th Infantry Regiment less one battalion. The second element, the Constabulary reserve, consisted of one regiment, supported by certain additional combat elements, especially the 7th Field Artillery Battalion, trained to operate in the field in close conjunction with the Constabulary reserve regiment. The third element was a mobile field headquarters maintained and trained as part of the headquarters of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. (10)

15. Concentration of the 26th Regimental Combat Team

a. In the summer of 1947 the Commanding General of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division was directed to prepare detailed plans for the concentration of the 26th Regimental Combat Team, which was to be established as a reserve for support of the U.S. Constabulary in the event of internal disorders in Germany. (11)

Early plans provided for the inclusion of one infantry regiment,

one light artillery battalion, one medium artillery battalion, one medium tank company, one engineer company, one medical company, and detachments of signal, ordnance, and quartermaster troops. Toward the end of July it was announced that the 26th Regimental Combat Team would be established in the Grafenwohr Training Area, beginning on 1 August, and with concentration complete by 25 September. After training there, the 26th RCT would be stationed permanently in the Bamberg-Erlangen-Grafenwohr area. (12) A directive published on 24 July 1947 revealed that the 26th RCT would consist principally of the three battalions of the 26th Infantry Regiment, the 5th Field Artillery Battalion, the 33d Field Artillery Battalion, and one company each from the 1st Engineer Battalion and the 1st Medical Battalion. Other elements were to be added by the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division. (13) The addition in August of one medium tank company would mark a reversal of the earlier policy which had eliminated tank elements from the Occupation Forces. At this time too, it was proposed to the War Department that light tank elements organized on a provisional basis be re-established in U.S. Constabulary. (14) The medium tank company added to the 26th RCT was the 12th Medium Tank Company. (15) In September another medium tank company, the 11th, was organized on a provisional basis and made part of the 26th RCT. (16)

b. By November the 26th RCT, then located at Bamberg and Erlangen, was composed of the following units:

- 26th Infantry Regiment less cannon company and antitank company
- 5th Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm. Howitzer, Truck-driven)
- 33d Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm. Howitzer, Truck-driven)
- 11th and 12th Medium Tank Companies (Grafenwohr)
- Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion
- Company C, 1st Medical Battalion
- Detachment, 1st Quartermaster Company

1st Platoon, 1st Signal Company
Detachment, 701st Ordnance Company
Detachment, 1st Military Police Company

It was referred to in November as the European Command reserve, and its concentration on a permanent basis, rather than for a training and maneuver period only, was significant. Its training program was prescribed and supervised by the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division. If committed to action in event of an emergency occurring in U.S. occupied territory, it was to be released to the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, or the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, Austria. It was required to be ready to move one-third of its force on four hours' notice and the remainder within twelve hours.
(17)

16. Effect of 26th RCT Concentration upon Other Elements of the 1st Infantry Division

a. When the 26th RCT was concentrated in the Grafenwohr Training Area in August and September 1947, it was necessary to replace the units comprising it by other units of the 1st Infantry Division for performance of the static duties of the Occupation. The first effect of the concentration was to spread even more thinly certain of the other elements of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. The 26th Infantry Regiment and the 5th and 33d Field Artillery Battalions were relieved from their static duties largely by the 1st Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment which was withdrawn from duty in the Bremen Enclave and stationed in Stuttgart, Ruernberg, Dachau, and Darmstadt.
(18)

Henceforth, no combat unit was stationed in the Bremen Enclave, but arrangements were made with the British Occupation Forces for reinforcement of U.S. service troops there in event of emergency, and movement of a force of the U.S. Constabulary across the British Zone to the Enclave.
(19)

b. That the wider dispersal of 1st U.S. Infantry Division units was only

a temporary expedient was demonstrated toward the end of 1947, when plans to form a second regimental combat team from elements of the 1st Infantry Division were formulated. (20) This action meant that military posts where such units were stationed would have to rely even more heavily than before on other available manpower and curtail to the utmost their Occupational duties, limiting such activities to essential tasks. On 1 March 1948 the 18th Infantry Regiment, less its 1st Battalion, was released from assignment to EUCOM Headquarters and returned to operational control of the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division. (21) Almost immediately, training to prepare the 18th Infantry for combat operations was begun. (22)

c. By the spring of 1948, when plans for summer training were formulated, the goal toward which Theater planners were working with regard to tactical forces was fairly clear. Their plans called for the concentration of the 1st Infantry Division, less the 16th Infantry Regiment (serving in Berlin and Austria) in the Grafenwohr Training Area, where unit training, including training at the regimental combat team level, and the use of automatic weapons, was to be stressed. Summer training was to point to a divisional exercise in which the 1st Infantry Division would be joined by (23) the 2d Constabulary Regiment and the 91st and 94th Field Artillery Battalions. The object of the training was to prepare the 1st Infantry Division to (24) operate as a strategic reserve.

17. Reorganization of U.S. Constabulary

a. Simultaneously with the inauguration of the new program with regard to training and assembly of the 1st Infantry Division, the U.S. Constabulary

was undergoing reorganization. By June 1947 the shortage of manpower in the Constabulary had become acute and reorganization was imperative. (35) It had never been possible to man the Constabulary up to its T/O strength nor to reach the original estimated strength of 38,000. Piecemeal reorganizations from the time it had become operational had constantly reduced its strength. During the reorganization of early 1947, a cut of 1,362, largely through the (36) elimination of all its light tank elements, had been made. On 30 June 1947, the Constabulary was manned at 98 percent of its officer strength and 73 percent of its authorized enlisted strength, but the organization as a whole (37) had an estimated combat efficiency of only 50 percent.

b. The reorganization of the Constabulary was largely necessary to make its paper organization correspond to reality. In addition the desire to create a Constabulary reserve was in accord with planning which had already resulted in a drastic search for manpower and the release of numerous 1st Division elements from static duties. The concept of a reserve was based on the possibility of creating a small but vigorous U.S. Army in Europe. The Constabulary reserve was to consist of one regiment reinforced by other (38) combat elements and non-Constabulary units as available. The Commanding General of the U.S. Constabulary was directed to free his reserve regiment from static duties and to prepare it through training and exercises for (39) immediate action at any spot.

c. By August, the Constabulary had prepared a plan for its own reorganization, calling for the discontinuance of one brigade headquarters and the inactivation of four regiments less one squadron, thus giving the Constabulary a total strength, not including units stationed in Berlin and

(30)

Austria, of 22,181. The War Department was requested to authorize these
(31)
inactivations, and on 10 September this approval was received.

18. The Constabulary Reserve

a. By the summer of 1947 a reconstituted German police force was already an efficiently operating organization and with improving conditions the threat of internal disorder in Germany was rapidly diminishing. The pattern developing was one in which the Theater reserve, consisting of the 1st Infantry Division (less the 16th Infantry Regiment) and elements of the Constabulary, as rapidly as these units could be relieved of police-type duties, filled an important place. On 3 July 1947, the 5th Constabulary Regiment, with headquarters at Augsburg, was designated the Constabulary reserve. At that time, the 5th Regiment consisted of the 35th and 74th Squadrons, manned at about 80 percent of their authorized strength. Upon being designated the reserve, the 5th Regiment was augmented by the 68th Squadron from the inactivated 3d Regiment, and the 66th Squadron from the inactivated 2d Regiment. Three squadrons -- the 35th, 68th, and 74th -- were concentrated at Augsburg in August while the 66th remained at Deggern-
(32)
dorf near the Austrian-German border. Steps were taken to increase the combat effectiveness of the reserve regiment by providing it with a light tank troop and a recoilless rifle troop. In July Troop "E," 74th Constabulary Squadron, was converted into a light tank troop and in August, Troop "E," 68th Constabulary Squadron, was reorganized as the Recoilless
(33)
Rifle Troop, both to form part of the reserve. These two troops, together with the headquarters and service troop, became a provisional squadron, bringing the number of squadrons comprising the reserve regiment to five.

with four concentrated in Augsburg in three adjoining kasernes.

b. On 30 September 1947 the 5th Constabulary Regiment was redesignated the 2d Constabulary Regiment, and the 74th and 35th Squadrons were redesignated, respectively, the 2d and 42d Squadrons. (34) By the end of September, the Constabulary reserve consisted of the 2d Constabulary Regiment (comprising the 2d, 42d and 68th Squadrons), a provisional squadron made up of a headquarters and service troop, a Recoilless Rifle Troop, and a Light Tank Troop, all stationed in Augsburg, and the 66th Squadron, stationed at Deggendorf.

c. The 66th Squadron was the only reserve unit excepted from instructions to "undertake no routine operational mission except those (35) essential to its training." It still retained static duties and in fact its area of responsibility was greatly enlarged, since it took over the area formerly occupied by the 35th Squadron, a reassignment which made it possible to reduce, but not eliminate entirely, the static responsibilities of the other squadrons. Each of the three numbered squadrons stationed in Augsburg (36) continued to have small areas of responsibility near that city, but these static responsibilities were so negligible that by the end of September, (37) seven of the sixteen lettered troops were in training. During the first two weeks of September, the 2d Constabulary Regiment participated in a series of tactical problems at the Grafenwohr Training Area, where it operated as a provisional regimental combat team, reinforced by the 7th Field Artillery (38) Battalion. The 7th Battalion was being trained under direction of the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division for combat operations in support of the 2d Constabulary Regiment.

d. By late autumn of 1947 one troop from each of the squadrons located in Augsburg was performing static duties, and three troops from each squadron were continually in training. In the last quarter of 1947 training proceeded in troop-size units and included airborne, rail transport, recoilless rifle, and light tank training. (39)

19. Proposal for Constabulary Field Artillery Units

Further evidence that Theater planners were beginning to think of the Constabulary more in terms of a tactical force than as a mere police agency was given in the request to the Department of the Army on 7 November 1947 for permission to organize elements of the Constabulary into field artillery battalions. (40)

General Clay desired the creation within the Constabulary of one 105 mm. and one 155 mm. field artillery battalion. He considered these units essential for support of the Constabulary in case of an emergency, and desired their training to begin as rapidly as possible. (41)

The Department of the Army approved the project on 10 December 1947, but directed that, since there was no Table of Organization for a Constabulary field artillery unit, the field artillery battalions be organized outside the Constabulary. (42)

Execution of this plan involved the elimination of the 94th Constabulary Squadron and Troop "D" of the 14th Constabulary Squadron, and the concurrent organization of the two field artillery battalions which were designated the 91st and 94th Field Artillery Battalions. On 19 December, EUCOM Headquarters issued orders inactivating the 94th Constabulary Squadron and Troop "D" of the 14th Constabulary Squadron, and activating the 91st and 94th Field Artillery Battalions. (43)

20. Other Measures to Improve Combat Efficiency

In addition to establishing a reserve, the European Command took other actions in the second half of 1947 designed to improve the combat effectiveness of the Occupation Forces. One important phase of this program was training in the use of individual weapons. Final results showed that, by 31 December, 97 percent of the personnel of the European Command authorized to fire weapons had completed either a record or a familiarization course. (44) Another phase of the program was the requirement that all major commanders prepare security plans for action in the event of an emergency. Each military post was required to hold alert exercises from time to time, subject to careful inspections and repeat performances when difficulties were observed. (45)

21. Summary of Tactical Concepts at End of 1947

a. Until the summer of 1946, and for the six months following that period, static duties in the Occupation had taken precedence over combat training, and the combat elements in the Occupation had been so extensively engaged in Occupation duties that a Theater reserve had, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. By the end of 1946, however, it had been recognized that internal unrest was not as grave a problem as the threat of invasion by an external major power; and this realization had served to justify, in the minds of planners, a more equitable distribution of manpower between Occupational duties and a combat reserve. By September 1946, planners were thinking in terms of a U.S. Army, Europe, and in the ensuing months steps were taken to bring about such a tactical organization.

b. As reorganization and a lessening of Occupational demands occurred,

elements of the 1st Infantry Division were reassembled and vigorous training instituted. Upon the concentration of the 26th RCT, other elements of the 1st Infantry Division were, momentarily, more widely dispersed. This dispersal, however, was only momentary, since the concentration of the U.S. Forces not only brought improved discipline, and increased potentialities for mutual help in event of emergency, but involved a release of real property to the German economy and a lessening of static duties. In 1947 the program of concentration permitted a reduction in the number of military posts from twenty-one to seventeen.

c. The program begun in 1947 went beyond the reassembling of the 1st Infantry Division and included the U.S. Constabulary. With a reconstituted German police force in operation, it was foreseen that the police-type duties of the Constabulary would no longer be a full-time job, and it was obvious that planners in EUCOM Headquarters were looking to the day when this organization, too, would be available as a Command reserve. By the end of 1947, one Constabulary regiment and one provisional squadron had been earmarked as a Constabulary reserve and two field artillery battalions had been activated from spaces given up by the Constabulary. Light tank elements were again becoming a part of the Constabulary, and a program of training for co-ordinated action by Constabulary reserve and the 1st Infantry Division had been set up. From such actions, it was possible to perceive the type of organization, patterned to the stringent manpower restrictions imposed upon the European Command and to the requirements of current circumstances affecting the European Command, which was planned for the future and which, by the end of 1947, was in its formative stages.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cable S - 2949, USFET sgd McHarney to AGWAR, 8 Mar 47.
2. Cable S - 2024, USFET sgd McHarney to AGWAR, 6 Feb 47.
3. Ibid.
4. USFET GO 228, 8 Aug 46.
5. USFET GO 247, 31 Aug 46.
6. USFET GO 49, 10 Mar 47.
7. EUCOM GO 123, 13 Nov 47.
8. Hq District III (1st Inf Div), Third U.S. Army Area, Station List No. 1, 31 Dec 46.
9. First Mil District Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 46.
10. Ltr, EUCOM to Maj Comd, 30 Sep 47, sub: Security Directive, U.S. Occupied Zones, Germany and Austria, AG 371.2 GOF.
11. EUCOM DCINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 16, 1 Jul 47, par 22.
12. Ibid., No. 19, 22 Jul 47, par 29.
13. Ltr, EUCOM to CG's, US Constabulary, USAFE, BPE, First and Second Mil Districts, 24 Jul 47, sub: Organization and Concentration of the 26th RCT, AG 322 GOF - AGO.
14. Cable S - 5310, EUCOM sgd Huebner to AGWAR, 2 Jun 47; ltr, EUCOM to CG, US Constabulary, 3 Jul 47, sub: Provisional Reorganization of Constabulary Units, AG 322 GOF.
15. Cables, S - 1984, EUCOM sgd Huebner to AGWAR, 12 Aug 47; W - 84445, WAR from D/Opn & Tng to EUCOM, 18 Aug 47; ltr, EUCOM to CG, First Mil District, 21 Aug 47, sub: Activation of the 12th Tank Company (Medium), AG 322 GOF - AGO.
16. Cable W - 86202, War to EUCOM, 12 Sep 47; ltr, EUCOM to CG, First Mil District, 17 Sep 47, sub: Activation of the 11th Tank Company (Medium), AG 322 GOF - AGO.
17. Ltr, EUCOM to CG's U.S. Constabulary, USAFE, OMGUS, 1st Inf Div, BPE, 7 Nov 47, sub: 26th Regiment Combat Team, AG 322 GOF.

18. Cable SX - 3876, EUCOM sgd Huebner to U.S. Constabulary, First and Second Mil Districts, CBS, OMCUS, 8 Apr 47.
19. EUCOM OPOT Div Opn & Plns Br Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, par eb (6) and attached papers; ltr, EUCOM to Maj Comd, 30 Sep 47, sub: Directive Governing the Operation of U.S. Constabulary, AG 322 GOF.
20. Cable SX - 1835, EUCOM sgd Huebner to 1st Inf Div, Hq Comd, EUCOM, 12 Feb 48.
21. Hq, First Mil District Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47, par 39c.
22. Ibid., 1 Jan - 31 Mar 48, par 30e.
23. Ltr, EUCOM to CG, 1st Inf Div, 10 Mar 48, sub: Summer Training of 1st U.S. Infantry Division, AG 353 GOF.
24. Hq, First Mil District Rept of Opn, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 48, par 34d.
25. Cable S - 5310, EUCOM sgd Huebner to AGWAR, 2 Jun 47.
26. EUCOM OPOT Div Pers Requirements Br Rept of Opn, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 47.
27. Cable S - 1306, EUCOM sgd Huebner to WAR for Dir Plns & Opn, 15 Jul 47.
28. Ltr, EUCOM to Maj Comd, 30 Sep 47, sub: Security Directive, U.S. Occupied Zones, Germany and Austria, AG 371.2 GOF.
29. Ibid., ltr, EUCOM to Maj Comd, 30 Sep 47, sub: Directive Governing the Operation of the U.S. Constabulary, AG 322 GOF.
30. EUCOM OPOT Div Pers Requirements Br Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, p. 8.
31. Cables, S - 2374, EUCOM to AGWAR, 29 Aug 47; W - 85996, WAR from D/Opn & Tng to EUCOM, 10 Sep 47.
32. 5th Constabulary Regt Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, pp. 1-2, 11-12.
33. Cable S - 5310, EUCOM sgd Huebner to AGWAR, 2 Jun 47; ltrs, EUCOM to CG, U.S. Constabulary, 3 Jul 47, sub: Provisional Reorganization of Constabulary Units; 31 Jul 47, sub: Provisional Reorganization Troop E, 68th Constabulary Squadron, AG 322 GOF.
34. 2d Constabulary Regt, Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, pp. 12.
35. Ltr, U.S. Constabulary, 9 Aug 47, sub: Policies Governing Training and Operation of the Constabulary Reserve Regiment.

36. 2d Constabulary Regt Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, sketch No. 5 following p. 2.

37. Ibid., p. 13.

38. Ibid., p. 14.

39. 2d Constabulary Regt Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47, pp. 9-17.

40. Cables, SX - 3791, 7 Nov 47, EUCOM agd Huebner to CofS, USA, for Wedemeyer; S - 3836, 12 Nov 47, same to CofS, USA; SX - 3985, 21 Nov 47, same to same.

41. Cable SX - 4101, EUCOM agd Huebner to USA CofS, for D/Org & Tng, 28 Nov 47.

42. Cables, W - 91444, DA from D/Org & Tng to EUCOM, 2 Dec 47; W - 91986, 10 Dec 47.

43. Ltr, EUCOM to CG, US Constabulary, 19 Dec 47, sub: Activation Reorganization, and Redesignation of Certain Constabulary Units, AG 322 GOT - AGO.

44. EUCOM CPOT Div Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, p. 6.

45. Ltr, EUCOM to Maj Comd, 30 Sep 47, sub: Security Directive, U.S. Occupied Zones, Germany and Austria, AG 371.2 GOT.

CHAPTER III

Reorganization of the Constabulary in 1948

CHAPTER III

Reorganization of the Constabulary in 1948

22. Rumors of Change in U.S. Constabulary

- a. Early in 1948 rumors that the U.S. Constabulary was about to be disbanded became widespread throughout the Occupation Forces. These rumors resulted in large part from the process, then in full swing, of relieving the Constabulary of many of its police-type activities such as border control, highway patrol, and other law enforcement functions, and of returning these duties to the reconstituted German police, supported by the Constabulary. They also resulted from a general realization that the aims of the Constabulary had been attained and that the Commanding General of U.S. Army, Europe, was determined to rebuild a tactical force, since there was apparently less of a potential threat from internal disorder than from outside aggression.
- b. These rumors were stimulated by the training plans outlined for the Constabulary in February 1948. The new training program for Constabulary personnel was based upon modified AGF tests in Leadership Exercises for

Platoon Leaders, the Rifle Platoon Combat Firing Test, the Cavalry Reconnaissance (Mechanized) Platoon Combat Firing Test, and the Reinforced Infantry Battalion Combat Firing Test. (1) This training was to be vigorously pursued in the spring and summer at Camp Jarman, Grafenwohr. At the same time small-unit training was intensified throughout the Constabulary. The fact that this training program closely approximated that of the 1st Division led to the belief that the Constabulary might be converted to an infantry organization.

c. By the spring of 1948 these rumors had become so persistent that General I. D. White, Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, felt it necessary to inform his staff that neither the Commander in Chief nor the Deputy Commander in Chief contemplated the elimination of the Constabulary. There was to be, however, an increasing emphasis on tactics as opposed to police duties. (2)

23. Beginning of the Reorganization

a. Reorganization began in the spring. On April 22 brigade commanders were directed to accomplish the provisional reorganization and rearming of line troops of Constabulary squadrons as far as available equipment and personnel would permit, the aim being to adapt the reorganized units more thoroughly to tactical missions. The police section of the troops was to be entirely eliminated, its functions turned over to the squadron headquarters provost marshal section, and its personnel used elsewhere. (3)

b. On 24 June General Clay, General Huebner, and General White held a conference concerning the role of Constabulary in the immediate future.

Among the matters considered were revision of the Constabulary's mission, the yielding of spaces by the Constabulary to the 1st Infantry Division to permit the latter to reorganize on the new Department of the Army T/O&E, and the reorganization of the Constabulary to better adapt it to the realities of the situation and to absorb its losses in spaces. General White and General Huebner both felt that the time had come to revise the mission of the Constabulary, and General Clay agreed that this should be done. It was decided that the Constabulary should begin immediately to draw up plans for its reorganization into the rough equivalent of an armored division and that the completed plans, approved by EUCOM Headquarters, should be dispatched to the Department of the Army for approval. More specifically, it was decided that a provisional reorganization along the lines discussed and approved (4) would begin at once. This reorganization would include the following steps: one troop of the 14th Constabulary Squadron would be turned over intact to the 1st U.S. Infantry Division with the remainder of the squadron becoming inoperative; priority in the reorganization would be given to the 2d Regiment, to be reorganized and trained as an Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), which would be employed in the September maneuvers and serve as a training school for other Constabulary units; an AAA AW Battalion cadre would be assembled immediately; spaces would be found for two additional field artillery battalions, the cadres to come from the 1st Infantry Division; all quartermaster support (except truck company) would be provided at EUCOM level; the Engineer Battalion would be a standard type Infantry Division Combat Battalion plus a bridge company; and ordnance support would be provided by an (5) Armored Ordnance Maintenance Battalion.

24. Training During the Reorganization Period

(6)

a. On 23 April by personal letter, the Commanding General of the Constabulary urged brigade commanders to stress the necessity of achieving uniformity in the training of Constabulary troops for tactical operations. Four days later, on 26 April, a training memorandum was published by Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, implementing his instructions and suggesting that a committee system be utilized to carry out a co-ordinated training program.

(7)

b. Included in the program at this time were such basic elements as the limited objective attack, hasty defense, delaying action, tactics and techniques of weapons, entrenchment, obstacles and demolitions. But by June, when the reorganization of the Constabulary was proceeding upon verbal orders, a basic change in training was ordered. On 23 June unit commanders were to completely suspend training for the primary or police mission and to concentrate upon training for the secondary or tactical mission. A high percentage of dismounted training time was to be devoted to platoon training, with stress in the higher echelons (troop through regiment) upon control, communications, and mobility. Still equipped under its old organizational plan, the Constabulary was relatively short of vehicles. It was felt, however, that higher echelon training could be conducted satisfactorily since its object was to develop ability to maintain contact and to secure and transmit information along a wide front. Meanwhile the Commanding General, 2d Constabulary Brigade, was charged with responsibility for setting up and operating a school to train tank crew men, drivers, gunners, tank commanders and tank officers for light and medium tanks of three proposed regiments.

(10)

25. Delay in Formal Reorganization

Preliminary steps looking to the reorganization of the Constabulary were undertaken upon verbal orders following the conference of the Commander in Chief, EUCOM; the Commanding General, USAREUR; and the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary. On 12 July 1948 the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, announced that the provisional reorganization of the Constabulary as planned in EUCOM had received the approval of the Department of the Army, but that formal reorganization could not be completed before September. During this entire period the Constabulary was operating without the equipment it would require under its new organization because its reorganization, unlike that of the 1st Infantry Division, was not along the line of a standard T/O&M unit, and requisitions upon the United States were deferred pending formal Department of the Army approval of the new organization. (11)

b. In the provisional reorganization which preceded formal Department of the Army approval, steps were taken on the basis of the following assumptions: that one troop at full strength from the 14th Constabulary Squadron would be transferred to the 1st U.S. Infantry Division; that passage of the Universal Military Service Bill would not affect the strength of Constabulary before 1949; that no appreciable replacements would be received prior to 1 January 1949; and that, with very few exceptions, personnel required to effect the provisional reorganization would be drawn solely from Constabulary sources.

26. The Reorganization Plan

a. The general plan, as projected in July, called for reorganizing the

Headquarters and Constabulary Special Troops along the lines of a modified Corps Headquarters (separate) and special troops with certain assigned supporting elements. For the Constabulary alone, a divisional type headquarters would have sufficed, but the directive placing command of both the Constabulary and the 1st U.S. Infantry Division under the Commanding General, Constabulary, in case of an emergency, was issued in accordance with the view that both these units would comprise a corps in tactical operation and that, in such a case, Headquarters Constabulary would be Corps Headquarters. To accomplish this end, it was planned to reorganize the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop of both the 1st and 2d Constabulary Brigades along the lines of a combat command headquarters on the assumption that no substantial (12) change in personnel would be required in this reorganization.

b. Further planning concerned reorganization of the 2d, 6th, and 14th Constabulary Regiments into Armored Cavalry Regiments (Light), plus one band organized under DA T/Q&E, the addition of one Constabulary squadron each to the 6th and 14th Constabulary Regiments, and the reorganization of the 547th Engineer Construction Battalion into an Engineer Combat Battalion, identical with the Engineer battalions attached to divisions, plus a separate bridge company. It was also planned to organize two additional field artillery battalions (light) using the 15th and 27th Constabulary Squadrons as carrier units with all units of Constabulary alerted to provide officer and enlisted artillery personnel to these units. The 28th Constabulary Squadron was designated as the carrier unit for the organization of one anti-aircraft battalion (AW), the cadre to be drawn from the 1st and 28th Constabulary Squadrons. The general plan followed was to transfer or reassign to

units slated for reorganization or continuance in their present status all personnel of those units scheduled for discontinuance. It was estimated that all subordinate units would be, at the time of the formal reorganization, at full authorized officer strength under the new T/O&E, but that the Constabulary would be short its authorized enlisted strength by 2,000 men.

Authority was granted to brigade and regimental commanders to effect these transfers in personnel at once. (13) On 3 July instructions were issued to facilitate an adjustment between the reorganization operation and the maneuvers at Grafenwohr, co-ordinated with those of the 1st Infantry Division, so that both the maneuvers and the process of reorganization could proceed simultaneously. (14)

27. Light Tank Training

On 29 July the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, directed that a Light Tank Training Center be established at Headquarters, 2d Constabulary Brigade, to train officers and enlisted men in the use of the M - 24 Tank (1). These men were to serve in turn as instructors in their parent units. Commanders of the 14th and 6th Constabulary Regiments were directed to send a cadre of selected officers and enlisted men to attend the school. (15)

28. Formal Reorganization of the Constabulary

a. The actual effect of the reorganization upon the Constabulary was to accomplish an organization which approximated that of an armored division with deviations dictated by the problem of manpower and by current conditions in Europe. While the reorganization in the three regiments comprising the bulk of the new Constabulary was already well along by the end of 1948, the

formal orders which authorized their reorganization and redesignation were not published until 20 December 1948, when the 2d, 6th and 14th Constabulary Regiments became the 2d, 6th and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments. (16) Of the Constabulary Squadrons, only the 32d and 53d were unaffected by the reorganization, these two squadrons continuing to be designated Constabulary squadrons and continuing with the police mission of the Constabulary. Other squadrons constituting the three regiments would, according to the Commanding General, Constabulary, be subordinated to the regimental organization. On 2 November, at a staff conference, he said: "I would like to develop within the regiments a feeling of regimental unity. I have taken steps in my headquarters to place the emphasis on the regiment and away from the squadrons of the regiment." (17)

b. On 16 December, the 70th and 74th Field Artillery Battalions were activated, utilizing personnel of the 15th and 37th Constabulary Squadrons, whose strength was reduced to zero. The 94th and 91st Field Artillery Battalions were reorganized, giving Constabulary four Field Artillery Battalions. (18) Other changes in connection with the reorganization included the activation of the 93d Engineer Bridge Platoon and the 73d Armored Ordnance Maintenance Battalion, utilizing equipment and personnel of the inactivated 7879th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion. The 8th Engineer Combat Battalion was redesignated the 54th Engineer Combat Battalion on 22 November. Thus, at the end of 1948, when the reorganization was complete, the changes in designation of Constabulary units were as follows:

Old DesignationNew Designation

2d Constabulary Regiment
2d Constabulary Squadron
42d Constabulary Squadron
68th Constabulary Squadron

2d Armored Cavalry (US Constabulary)
1st Battalion
2d Battalion
3d Battalion

6th Constabulary Regiment
25th Constabulary Squadron
51st Constabulary Squadron
66th Constabulary Squadron

6th Armored Cavalry (US Constabulary)
1st Battalion
2d Battalion
3d Battalion

14th Constabulary Regiment
10th Constabulary Squadron
1st Constabulary Squadron
6th Constabulary Squadron

14th Armored Cavalry (US Constabulary)
1st Battalion
2d Battalion
3d Battalion

27th Constabulary Squadron
15th Constabulary Squadron

74th Field Artillery Battalion
70th Field Artillery Battalion

7879th Ordnance Maintenance
Battalion

73d Armored Ordnance Maintenance
Battalion

8th Engineer Combat Battalion

54th Engineer Combat Battalion

The authorized strength of each of the three Armored Cavalry Regiments was
(19)
139 officers, 11 warrant officers and 2,460 enlisted men.

c. At end of 1948 the Commanding General, Constabulary, reported that the personnel situation was greatly improved, and that a special Constabulary recruiting team was meeting with success in the United States. On 28 December he reported to General Clay that the difficulties which had attended earlier requisitions for equipment no longer existed. He summarized the situation as follows: "Equipment is arriving on schedule. We have intentionally drawn about fifty percent of our authorized light tanks and thirty percent of our heavy tanks. All the tanks are in the Theater. We are drawing them according to a set schedule which will be completed by 10 March 1949. This has been done to coincide with the training of our drivers and mechanics, all of whom will be returned from school by that time."

(20)

FOOTNOTES

1. US Constabulary, Constabulary Training Program, 24 Feb 48, change 13.
2. US Constabulary, CofS Conference Notes, 2 Jun 48.
3. US Constabulary, Monthly Rept of Opn, Apr 48.
4. US Constabulary, Fragmentary Instructions of the Commanding General Issued to G - 1, G - 2, G - 3, and G - 4, at 250930 June 1948, 26 Jun 48.
5. Ibid.
6. Ltr. to Brigade Commanders from CG US Constabulary, 22 Apr 48.
7. Tng Memo, US Constabulary, 26 Apr 48, sub: Standardization of Training in Minor Tactics.
8. Ibid.
9. Tng Memo No. 2, US Constabulary, 23 Jun 48.
10. US Constabulary G - 3 Sec Rept of Opn, Jun 48, p. 8.
11. US Constabulary Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48, p. 30.
12. US Constabulary Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48, p. 30.
13. Ibid., pp. 30, 31.
14. US Constabulary, Operations Instructions No. 4, 3 Jul 48, Appendix A.
15. Tng Memo No. 8, US Constabulary, 20 Jul 48.
16. US Constabulary GC No. 47, 9 Dec 48.
17. US Constabulary Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48, p. 1.
18. Cable WX - 02684, DA D/Plns & Org to EUCOM, 1 Dec 48.
19. US Constabulary Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48, pp. 28, 29; D/A T/O&E 17 - 51.
20. US Constabulary Rept of Opn, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48, p. 3.

CHAPTER IV

Reorganization of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division in 1948

CHAPTER IV

Reorganization of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division in 1948

29. Difficulties Involved in Reorganization

a. Simultaneously with the reorganization of the U.S. Constabulary, plans were made to reorganize the 1st Infantry Division under the new T/O&E (1) prepared by the Department of the Army. Such a reorganization followed logically upon the reassembly of the Division and the return to the Commanding General of the Division of operational control of its elements from the various posts at which they had been stationed. Although reorganization was delayed by the fact that certain of the Tables of Organization and Equipment involved had not yet been approved and published, it was indicated that the new organization would require approximately five thousand spaces more than the old-type infantry division. On the other hand, the increase in personnel within the division would make it more nearly self-supporting in line with the aims of current Command policy governing tactical troops.

b. On 17 September, EUCCOM was directed by the Department of the Army to

proceed with the reorganization of the 1st Infantry Division, which would have an authorized strength of 952 officers, 48 warrant officers, and 17,751 enlisted men, aggregating 18,751. The reorganization was to be effected by 10 October. Actually, as in the case of the Constabulary, provisional reorganization was already under way.

c. It was impossible for EUCOM Headquarters to consider the reorganization of the 1st Infantry Division apart from the reorganization of U.S. Constabulary and the composition of the OEB, for the major problem in connection with the reorganization was that of finding within the authorized Theater troop basis 3,297 spaces to implement the reorganization. The actual difference between the old-type division and the new-type division was 5,662 spaces, and in July U.S. Constabulary was informed that, in effecting its reorganization, it would have to provide 3,500 of the required spaces. However, the addition of other units resulted in approximately 2,365 spaces being made available. After discussions with the various staff divisions, OPOT decided that other spaces required would be drawn from various services, military posts, and units in the Theater; and in this way, through small requisitions on many agencies, a total of 3,222 spaces were yielded, leaving OPOT Division with a reserve of approximately 190, mostly officers.

30. Changes in the New Division T/O&E

To make 1st Infantry Division conform to the new T/O&E, the Department of the Army directed that the following actions be taken: Headquarters Special Troops to be redesignated as 1st Replacement Company and inactivated;

in the 1st Medical Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment to be redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company A redesignated as an Ambulance Company; Company B to be disbanded; Company C to be relieved of assignment to Company B and redesignated Medical Detachment, Division Headquarters, 1st U.S. Infantry Division; Company D redesignated as the Clearing Company. The 701st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company was to be redesignated the 701st Ordnance Maintenance Company (drawing additional equipment for maintenance of tanks). One mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was to be transferred intact from U.S. Constabulary and redesignated the 1st Reconnaissance Company. An additional company, Company D, was to be activated for the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion. In each of the Division's regiments -- the 16th, 18th and 26th -- the medical detachments were to be redesignated Medical Companies. An antitank company and a cannon company were to be activated and redesignated as Tank Company and Heavy Mortar Company, respectively, for each Regiment. A tank battalion, the 745th, was to be activated and redesignated the 63d Heavy Tank Battalion; and the 639th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was to be activated and redesignated the 48th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion. All of these units which were to be newly activated or reorganized were to be assigned as organic elements of the 1st Infantry Division.

(4)

31. Provisional Reorganization

a. Although the official reorganization was not to be effective until 10 October 1948, by 22 July the provisional reorganization directed by EUCOM Headquarters, with Department of the Army approval, had been completed. Most

of the reorganization was carried out, despite serious shortages in trained
(5)
officers, prior to 1 July, and on that date, the following units, including
organic elements and those for support of the 1st Infantry Division, were
present with the Division in the Grafenwohr training area:

16th Infantry Regiment (Minus 3d Battalion)
18th Infantry Regiment
26th Infantry Regiment
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st U.S.
Infantry Division Artillery
5th Field Artillery Battalion
7th Field Artillery Battalion
32d Field Artillery Battalion
33d Field Artillery Battalion
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st U.S.
Infantry Division
1st U.S. Infantry Division Band
1st Signal Company
1st Quartermaster Company
701st Ordnance Company
1st Medical Battalion
1st Engineer (Combat) Battalion
7825th Station Complement Unit (Mobile)
11th Tank Company (Heavy)
12th Tank Company (Heavy)
531st Ordnance Tank Maintenance Company
511th Quartermaster Service Company
556th Ordnance MAM Company
58th TC Truck Company
63d TC Truck Company
425th Army Band
7866th Headquarters and Headquarters and
Service Company, Heavy Tank Battalion
7711th Air Liaison Detachment
7793d Augmentation Detachment
1st Military Police Company

Units assigned to the 1st U.S. Infantry Division but not present in the
Grafenwohr Training Area were:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
57th Field Hospital	Wuerzburg
3d Battalion, 16th Inf Reg	Berlin
8591st Labor Service Platoon	Darmstadt
34th TC Truck Company	Muernberg
59th TC Truck Company	Muernberg
544th TC Truck Company	Muernberg
590th TC Truck Company	Muernberg
7931st Ordnance Evacuation Company	Kitzingen

(6)

b. By 22 July the provisional reorganization was completed pending the assignment of personnel and the issue of equipment to fill the T/O&E. Tank companies for the 18th and 26th Regiments had been formed previously as the 11th and 12th Tank Companies, respectively, and on 7 July, the 16th Infantry Regimental Tank Company and the 1st U.S. Infantry Division Heavy Tank Battalion were organized. The 1st U.S. Infantry Division Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled) was formed on 17 July and on 1 August, the 1st Reconnaissance Company was organized.

(7)

c. To meet the over-all personnel demands required by the reorganization, arrangements for the transfer of spaces from U.S. Constabulary and from other Theater units were directed by OPOT Division, EUCOM Headquarters. It was more difficult to find in the Theater enough available officers with sufficient field training to handle their assignments. However, between 1 July and 10 October, a thorough search was made of other units and agencies in the Theater, and wherever feasible, ground officers with experience were transferred from static assignments to the new elements of the Division. By the middle of August a flow of officers from the United States had completely alleviated this problem. By 10 October, when the formal reorganization became effective, the actual reorganization had already been implemented by

the organization of the new organic units to be added and by the addition
(8)
of necessary personnel and equipment.

32. Training of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division during 1948

a. During the first six months of 1948, the training of the Division was along the lines generally in use in the Theater. It consisted largely of individual training with small arms and training in the use of crew-served weapons, as directed by the OPOT Division, EUCOM Headquarters plus
(9)
small unit training in tactical problems. Previously, emphasis had been placed entirely upon on-the-job training for Occupational tasks. The widespread adoption of tactical training, even if provided for a short number of hours each week (as was the case with most troops in the Theater unattached to a tactical organization and even with many attached to tactical units but assigned to Occupational missions) represented a significant change in Occupation policy.

b. By the spring of 1948, the provisional reorganization of both the 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary was visualized and under way, and during the rest of 1948 exercises were projected in which both these
(10)
organizations were to participate as units of U.S. Army, Europe.

c. Throughout the latter half of 1948, the 1st Infantry Division pursued its own training courses in addition to the combined exercises. The divisional exercises were designed to test and perfect various operational procedures. On 5 August the Division was alerted early in the morning and moved out of the Grafenwohr area to assembly areas south of Nuernberg, spending the night there and returning to Grafenwohr the following day. During the month of August,

all infantry battalions of the Division engaged in river assault training under the direction of the 1st Engineer (Combat) Battalion. On 23 August the Division began a series of exercises called PRIME and GREEN. Exercise PRIME, held in August, was designed to test the mobility of the Division and its reaction to alerts. Various other exercises involving only the 1st Infantry Division were planned and carried out during the remainder of the year, some of them involving co-ordination between artillery and infantry, and between fighter bomber groups and ground forces.

(11)

FOOTNOTES

1. DA T/O&E 7 - N, 7 Jul 48.
2. Cable W - 89332, DA D/Org & Tng to EUCOM, 17 Sep 48.
3. EUCOM OPOT Div ROEM Br Rept of Opa, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48, p. 8.
4. Cable W - 89332, DA from D/Org & Tng to EUCOM, 17 Sep 48.
5. 1st US Inf Div Rept of Opa, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48, G - 3 Sec, pp. 1, 2.
6. Memo No. 22, 1st US Inf Div, 20 Jul 48.
7. 1st US Inf Div Rept of Opa, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48, G - 3 Sec, p. 2.
8. 1st US Inf Div Rept of Opa, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48, G - 1 Sec, pp. 2, 3.
9. EUCOM OPOT Div Ed & Tng Br Rept of Opa, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 48; 1 Apr - 30 Jun 48.
10. EUCOM OPOT Div Tng & Ed Br Rept of Opa, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 48.
11. 1st US Inf Div Rept of Opa, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48, G - 3 Sec, pp. 2, 3.

CHAPTER V

Development of U.S. Army, Europe

CHAPTER V

Development of U.S. Army, Europe

33. Situation at End of 1948

a. By the end of the year, U.S. Army, Europe, consisted, for tactical purposes, of a Theater Headquarters (USAREUR), a corps headquarters (approximate) (U.S. Constabulary), and two major tactical units, the 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary, supported by their own field artillery, by fighter bomber groups of USAFE, and by extensive logistics services operating under EUCOM Headquarters.

b. The chain of command began with the Commanding General, U.S. Army, Europe. In event of a tactical alert the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, was to become field commander of all tactical forces in the Theater. The Constabulary, therefore, continued to maintain the equivalent of a corps headquarters, with both Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division to be placed under that headquarters in event of emergency. Except in the case of an emergency, the 1st Infantry Division, through its Commanding General,

was to report directly to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe. Aside from its normal divisional headquarters, the 1st Infantry Division maintained a mobile field headquarters, ready to move on short notice.⁽¹⁾

34. Effect of the Reorganization

a. The effect of the reorganization of tactical forces in EUCOM was to draw soldiers from Occupational missions and static assignments and return them to their primary mission. The over-all effect was the creation of an army adapted to meet the requirements resulting from United States participation in the Occupation of Germany and capable of maintaining and supporting United States policy in Europe.

b. In the reorganization of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, the Division was augmented by more than 5,000 spaces and by the addition of organic units which strengthened it as a tactical unit and served to make it more self-sufficient in the field. Although the reorganization of 1st U.S. Infantry Division took place along organizational lines prescribed under Army-wide policy, other units not usually organic to the Infantry Division but essential under the peculiar conditions existing in Germany, were also added.

c. The reorganization of the U.S. Constabulary, while it followed generally the T/O&E of the regular U.S. Armored Division, was marked by certain differentiating features resulting from the fact that the Constabulary had originally been organized in the European Theater to perform a specific mission, but was later altered to permit not only performance of its basic police-type mission, but service as an armored tactical unit as well. Instead of being organized along divisional lines, U.S. Constabulary Headquarters

was organized along modified corps lines to permit it to serve as a corps headquarters in the field in an emergency. Its three armored cavalry regiments (light) were organized, individually, in accordance with Department of the Army T/O&E's. In addition to these basic elements, the Constabulary had two squadrons, organized under the original Constabulary T/O&E's, which continued to perform police-type duties in connection with the Occupation.

d. Under their new organization, both the U.S. Constabulary and the 1st Division were more capable of supporting themselves in the field than before, but it was planned that major logistics support for both tactical units would come from EUCOM agencies. Work on a logistics support plan for the tactical elements of the Occupation Forces continued throughout 1948, and toward the end of the year a definite plan, designed to be practicable in an emergency, began to take shape.

35. Joint Training in 1948

a. Various joint exercises were planned for the latter part of 1948, as well as for 1949, to test mobility, communications, and logistics support; to develop liaison with French and British elements in the Occupation, and to develop tactical procedures. Exercises held in 1948 were hampered by the process of reorganization, by lack of equipment, and by the fact that the U.S. Army in Europe, as a unit, was still a new organization feeling its way.

b. During the summer of 1948, elements of the U.S. Constabulary held a joint maneuver in the French Zone with French Occupation troops to develop liaison between the two forces, improve mobility, and demonstrate to French troops the use of the recoilless rifle. On 27 July a free maneuver, exercise BLACK, was held in the Grafenwohr area with the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and

the 6th Constabulary Regiment participating. The final exercise of the summer period was exercise NORMAL, in which the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and the 2d Constabulary Regiment participated. This exercise was held in three phases. Phase 1, lasting four days, was the movement of the 1st Division and the 2d Constabulary Regiment (acting as aggressor forces) to assembly areas north and south of Grafenwohr, a meeting engagement, and a free maneuver. Phase 2, lasting for six days, was a continuation of the free maneuvering of 1st U.S. Infantry Division against the aggressor force, with a critique by members of the European Command Staff at its conclusion. Phase 3, lasting two days, consisted of the tactical movement of both the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and the 2d Constabulary Regiment to winter quarters.
(3)

36. Plans for 1949

Training plans for 1949 contemplated a maneuver designed to promote co-ordinated action on the part of all tactical elements, including co-ordination with USAFE, and to test their logistics support. Far more extensive exercises than any staged in 1948, and involving more complicated problems, were being worked out by the OPOT Division, EUCOM Headquarters, as the year ended. The training program for 1949, with its emphasis upon U.S. Army, Europe, with air co-ordination, indicated the extent to which U.S. troops in Germany had been molded, in the space of two intensive years, into a highly organized tactical force.

UNCLASSIFIED

FOOTNOTES

1. EUCOM OPOT Div Rept of Opn, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 48; 1 Apr - 30 Jun 48; 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48; 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48; US Constabulary Opn Dir No. 1 (1048) 24 Nov 48.
2. EUCOM OPOT Div Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48; 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48; US Constabulary Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48; 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48; 1st US Inf Div Rept of Opn, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 48; 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48.

UNCLASSIFIED



OCCUPATIONAL ZONES — GERMANY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~